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Recent studies have critically analyzed the theory and practice of the World Health
Organization (WHO) and other intemational health organizations in the planning and
execution ofprimary health care programs in the Third World. Navarro (1984) argues
that the Alma Ata Declaration sees primary health care more in terms of accessible
health services. While not minimizing the importance of an expansion of medical
services, Navarro notes that "most improvements in health have been due to changes
in economic, social and political structures rather than in the health sector" (1984:472).
Heggenhougen (1984) suggests that calls by WHO for community participation will
not by themselves alter the power relations in a state. In fact, community organizing
may lead to state repression. Ugalde (1985) argues that the embrace of community
participation within WHO-sponsored programs may in fact legitimize low-quality care
for the poor while generating their support for regimes for whom equity, in fact, is not
on the political agenda. More recently, Donahue (1986) and Green (n.d.) note that,
once organized for health, communities can make demands that governments might not
otherwise have anticipated or wanted. In that regard, Rifkin and Walt (1986) have.
observed that intemational health organizations have turned of late to the promotion of
top-down., "categorical" hea1th programs rather than continue with broad-based,
comprehensive health programs that are more politically sensitive.
The purpose of this discussion is to address primary health care and international
assistance within the context of Nicaragua's unique history and evolving political
economy. Given the fact that intemational health organizations are involved in
programs of primary health care in all countries of Central America, including
Nicaragua, the discussion will, one hopes, provide for more of a comparative
perspective on the politics of intemational assistance than might result either from a.




The Nicaraguan political economy has passed through three periods since the
revolution of 1979, each of which has had a different impact on the health sector.
Durlng the First Period (1979-1984) there was an enormous effort made to reconstruct
a country left devastated by the Somoza dictatorship and nearly two years of civil war.
The major reforms inc1uded the confiscation of the Somoza family land holdings,
economic nationalization and the widening of foreign trade, public investment in the
domestic economy, agrarian reform, a mixed economy, and political decentralization
combined with popular participation. Changes in the health sector during this period
of rapid transformation inc1uded the creation of a nationalized health system that
integrated twenty-three semiautonomous health bureaucracies that had duplicated and
fragmented health services before the revolution (Bossert 1982, 1985; Donahue 1986;
Williams 1983).
To further guarantee that all would have access to the health system, the Ministry
of Health (MINSA) developed a territorial structure in which the entire country was
divided into six regional health administration units, three special health zones, and a
total of 103 health areas each served by a clinic or health post (see map). Medical
school enrollments were dramatically increased, and, with the Law of Obligatory
Social Service, previously underserved areas of the country began to receive medical
personnel (tables 1 and 2).1 During this period, health became the engine ofpopular
participation in extensive education programs coordinated with mass drug
administration efforts (Popular Health Days), and carried out through the newly
created Popular Health Councils. The MINSA began to develop its planning capacity
during this time, but in the process found itself in a struggle between two primary
health care strategies, one that emphasized a clinical or institutional approach and
another that stressed "outreach," prevention, and nonc1inical medicine (Donahue
1986). Associated with each approach was the training of cornmunity health workers
and midwives who would work in coordination with area c1inics and popular health
councils (Scholl 1985).
During this "Golden Age" of health care the incidence of cornmunicable diseases
declined, polio was eliminated in 1982, and a massive anti-malaria campaign reached
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70.1 percent of the population (Garfield and Vennund 1983; tables 3 and 4). The
World Health Organization declared Nicaragua to be a model fOl countries seeking 10
meet the goal of "Health for All by the Year 2000."
Health Planning in War Time
During the Second Period (1984-1985), the political economy evidenced the
growing impact, economic and military, of the contra war. The war resulted in th~
loss ofboth human and material health resources (Garfield 1985; Garfield et al. 1987;
Williams 1987). UNICEF estimates that 348 health technicians and professionals, of
whom 48 were employees of the MINSA, were killed in the conflicts between 1980
and 1987 (CARE 1988:6). Losses of social service facilities include 67 schools and
125 social service and feeding centers. The los s of health infrastructure must be
counted not only in tenns of actual material destruction, but also in tenns of lost
services that would have otherwise been provided during the past eight years (see
tables 1 and 2). The Ministry of Health reported that by the end of 1987, 106 of the
600 health units in the country were closed because of the war. According to the
CARE report, these included the partial or complete destruction of 1 hospital, 7 health
centers, and 61 health posts (CARE 1988:36). Another 37 health posts were closed
and construction on another 22 was abandoned due to contra raids (CARE 1988:6).
Mancotal is a government resettlement and agricultural cooperative some three
hours north of the municipal seat of Jinotega. Most of the 120 families come from the
Pantasma Valley, a scene of constant fighting farther to the north along the Honduran
horder. The community health center was first attacked and destroyed in 1983 and has
subsequently been rebuilt and destroyed two more times. Contras, who reportedly
consider it a "sin" to live in the settlements, come into the town at night and selectively
attack the homes of those who are more involved in social and economic development.
Residents no longer farm cooperatively and must now travel three hours to Jinotega
for health services. The CARE team concluded, "It is difficult to detennine what
motivates these people to stay in a very dangerous area. .. Were a pennanent cease
fire to come, they uniformly stated that their goal s would be to recondition the health
center, recruit a medical staff, and to grow more food" (CARE 1988:60).
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The Ministry of Health (MINSA) responded to the escalating costs of the war by
shifting resources to meet the medical needs of soldiers and civilians, especially
casualties requiring specialty care and rural peoples displaced by the war.
The original model of the National Unified Health System (SNUS) changed under
increasing economic and military pressure. There was a shift to the training of medical
specialists whose services demanded greater investments in hospitals and medical
equipment. Health ceased to be the cutting edge of popular participation. Primary
health care was no longer a priority and patients began to seek medical attention in
already crowded hospitals, bypassing, in many instances, the area clínico During this
period, many of the advances made between 1979 and 1984 showed signs of reversal.
Vaccinations leveled off in 1984 and 1985 (table 3), and cases of measles and
whooping cough rose, especially in the war-torn, central region of the country (table
4). Health personnel had fewer supplíes and medicines, were frequentIy rotated, and
were not able to do more than try to keep up with clínical demando Summing up the
situation, CARE observed that "the public health budget in Nicaragua through 1983
had increased the share for primary health care and reduced the proportion for hospital
careo Since 1984, hospital care has again received relatively greater funding. The war
led to a step backward in the health system, toward greater dependence on specialty
skills of surgeons and physicians and a subsequent decline in attention to preventive
health measures" (CARE 1988:41).
During the Third Period (1986-1988), the polítical economy witnessed efforts "to
guarantee 10the people . .. the basic necessitiesfor survival,adapting strategiesof an
economy of resistance, having as its fundamental objective assurance of the defense
and the economic future of the country" (MINSA 1988a:5). First, several
organizational steps were taken to correct previous imbalances in the delívery system.
There was a reorganization in the health sector in an effort to restore the planning
function, to revitalíze prevention programs, and reinstate the referral system. To
address a lack of correspondence between health polícies and priorities and the actual
workings of the system at the regional or area level, more flexibility was sought to
allow the various regions to adapt to local needs especially in the areas of prevention
and health education. More coordination with health efforts of the military services
and the private sector was also made a priority.
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6. Rural Health Services
for Children
7. Pre-school Services
8. Basic Popular Education
9. Water Supply






a UNICEF 1983 UNICEF Program: Nicaragua. Managua, Nicaragua.
mimeo.
b UNICEF 1988 La Cooperacion de UNICEF en Nicaragua. Documento










Financial Assistance for Projects (in US $)
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a b
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Duration
1~. Five Year Plan for Rural
Developrnent (PQRDI)
685,300 (1986-1990)
15. Five Year Plan for Child
Survival (PQSI)
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and Nutrition (PQAN)
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17. Universal Prirnary Education
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a UNICEF 1983 UNICEF Program: Nicaragua. Managua, Nicaragua.
rnirneo .
b UNICEF 1988 La Cooperacion de UNICEF en Nicaragua. Documento
preparado para: Mid-Term Review. Managua, Mayo 23-25, 1988. rnirneo.
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Second, the quality of health services was recognized as deficient. This was due
in part to the fact that an increasing number of medical personnel were recent graduates
and had tittle experience in the delivery system.
Third, the supply of services was recognized as insufficient in relation to demand
and needs. Since 1984 utilization measures, such as medical encounters, seemed to
suggest that the supply of services was at best only being maintained and was actually
decreasing in Region 111(Managua) and on the Atlantic coast (tables 5 and 6). More
problematical still was the fact that the system was not adjusting to shifts in population
growth, age structure, and movement. There continued to be an exaggerated reliance
on hospital services by adults when children continued to have the most need. For
example, there were fewer pediatric encounters in 1986-1987 than in the period 1984-
1985 even though a declining infant mortality and a high fertility rate increased the
absolute number of children needing careo
International Organizations and Health in Nicaragua
The discussion now turns to the role, positive and negative, played by intemational
organizations in health delivery in Nicaragua. Reference has already been made to the
recognition that the international health organizations gave to Nicaragua for its efforts
in primary health care during the period 1979-1984. We now tum to a discussion of
the more detailed involvement of the World Health Organization, its regional affiliate,
the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), and UNICEF. The discussion would
be incomplete, however, without an analysis of the role played by two American
govemmental agencies, the United States Agency for Intemational Development
(USAID) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In fact, the policies of those two
institutions have, at different times and in different ways, shaped the evolution of the
Nicaraguan national health system and even the funding priorities of the intemational
health donor agencies. We will begin with a brief overview of their respective roles.
The Epidemiology of War
United States health assistance to the Somoza govemment was minimal until the
mid-1960s, when a loan of $2.2 million provided for fifty-five rural health centers. In
1973 the underutilization and inefficiency of the rural health center program prompted
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USAID to propose two grants, one to enhance cornmunity use of the centers, and the
other to improve planning and administration of the rural health programs. In 1977 a
third program was fundOOwhose purpose was to provide potable water and sewerage
systems to rural communities. Somoza used the two programs as part of his
counterinsurgency and pacification programs in Esteli and Matagalpa (Donahue
1986:18).
In 1976 American hea1th advisors and high ranking officials of the Somoza
Ministry of Hea1th met in Chinandega to discuss among other issues how the
duplication and fragmentation of the existing health sector might be addressed. Both
parties agreOOthat the answer lay in the "promulgation of a new organic law for the
health sector, establishing a single institution combining the functions of the major
existing health agents" (USAID 1976:239). The integration did not take place under
Somoza; it was finally realized in the creation of the UnifiOONational Health System
(SNUS) on August 8, 1979, three weeks after the revolution. USAID funding also
went to the construction of a new office complex in Managua for the Ministry of
Health and to the construction of several hospitals. This funding, already in the
pipeline at the time of the revolution, did not cease until March 1982 when the Reagan
administration endOObilateral assistance to Nicaragua. Under pressure from the
Unitoo States, the World Bank (IBRD) endOOlending to Nicaragua in June of the same
year and the Interamerican Development Bank (BID) followOOsuit in February 1984.
Congress would not again propose any foreign aid to Nicaragua until March 1988.
The end of bilateral assistance to Nicaragua was part of a larger policy of military,
economic, and political destabilization initiated by the Reagan administration in
November 1981 with the signing ofNational Security Directive No. 17. The CIA was
allocatOO$19.5 million and authorizOOto organize anti-Sandinista units of the former
Somoza National Guard for military operations in Nicaragua. By June 1982 the so-
called contras were assassinating minor governmental officials, and were carrying out
attacks against agricultural cooperatives and health c1inics,primarily in the central and
eastern parts of the country (Regions 1, V, and VI andSpecial Zones 1, 2, and 3).
Between 1983 and 1984 the CIA and its operatives, "unilaterally controllOO latino
assets" (UCLAs), would carry out twenty-two air, land, and sea operations against
Nicaragua (Kornbulh 1987:29). The revelations of these activities in April1984 100to
a congressiorial cutoff of aid to the contras later that year. In the meantime, the Reagan
administration initiated a trade embargo against Nicaragua and shiftOOthe coordination
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of covert operations to the National Security Council. In June 1985 Congress
authorized $27 million in "humanitarian" aid to the contras and one year later provided
$100 million in military assistance.
In August 1987 the presidents of Central America signed the Peace Plan in
Guatemala. In March 1988 the Sandinistas and the contras agreed to a cease-fIre. In
the same month Congress rejected further military aid to the contras, but approved
$47.9 million in aid. Of that amount $17.7 million was allocated to the contras, $10
million for a commission to monitor compliance with the cease-fIre agreement, and
$2.5 million to USAID to administer a grant of $17.7 million for medical care and
other services to children who are victims of the war (New York Times, April 6,
1988). The legislation directed that "none of the assistance may be provided to or
through the Government of Nicaragua" ("Children's Survival Assistance Program" -
Public Law 100-276).2
USAID contracted CARE International to carry out a needs assessment and
feasibility study. CARE made its recommendations in a report dated June 17, 1988.
The report lists among the key service providers two governmental agencies, five
multinational organizations, three bilateral aid programs, and some twenty-six private
voluntary organizations (PVOs).3
The CARE needs assessment team estimated that the number of children under 17
years of age affected by the war exceeded 500,000. These included children living
within the conflict zones, especially Region V (Chontales), Region VI (Matagalpa),
and Region I (Esteli); children returning to Nicaragua as war refugees, especially along
the Atlantic coast; children displaced by war and living in marginal urban areas; and
those with direct needs as a result of the war, including the orphaned, the physically
injured, and the psychologically traumatized.
CARE noted that the immediate needs of children "are offset, to a degree, by the
tenacity of the governmental ministries and other service providers in maintaining basic
levels of outreach coverage, even within the war zones" (1988:4). (See tables 1,5,
and 6. ) Nevertheless, shortfalls in basic food production in the war zones contributed
to deteriorating nutrition, while a galloping inflation rate made the purchase of even the
most elemental cash goods prohibitive for both families and for governmental
programs dependent on foreign exchange.
The impact of the war on the Nicaraguan people can be measured in the short and
long termo The loss of life has had an immediate and personal effect on many
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Nicaraguan families. Since 1981 some 50,000 lives have been lost in the conflicto
When combined with the 40,000 who died during the insurrection of 1979, nearly .04
percent of the country's 3.4 million people have died during the past ten years. That is
a proportionately greater aggregate death rate than the .003 percent experienced by the
U.S. population during the Vietnam War (1965 to 1973) or the .03 percent
experienced during World War TI(Garfield et al. 1987:615; CARE 1988:8).
Given the youthfulness of the population, it is not surprising that the war has taken
a high to11on children. By 1987 the number of orphans had reached 10,077; those
wounded, 3,407; child amputees, 600; burn victims, 200; children with spinal cord
injuries, 200; kidnapped, 2,236; and ki11ed,1,553 (CARE 1988:7,47). CARE found
that many injured or orphaned children were already being cared for within their
cornmunities. Many of the children who received specialized care for bums and
amputations were confined to their homes for lack of ongoing referral and treatment
services (CARE 1988:7). Among the orphaned children, only 531 were
institutionalized, the majority being cared for in the homes of friends or relatives.
Recent Nicaraguan legislation provides a pension of 25 percent of the deceased
parent's monthly incpme for each child orphaned by the war (CARE 1988:65). The
long-term effects of the war will be felt in the continuing need for secondary and
tertiary care services for the handicapped. More difficult to assess is the effect of the
psychological trauma on both children and adults.
A recent study (Myers 1987) compared two communities, one in a war zone near
the Honduran border and one in a conflict-free zone near the border with Costa Rica.
The war zone cornmunity suffered greater losses in agricultura! production than did the
control cornmunity. Both evidenced declines in the consumption of basic staple foods,
but considerable differences existed in the percentage of decline between the two
cornmunities. For example, 67 percent of the households in the war zone village
consumed less corn as compared with 37 percent in the other; for rice it was 78 percent
and 58 percent less and for beans 61 percent and 35 percent less. The researchers
found low prevalence of severe acute undernutrition in both towns, which they
suggest may be due to the government rationing system that insures minimal supplies
of staple cornmodities.
Among the children sampled in the two towns (n=108), only 38 percent in the war
zone community had a11vaccinations complete, as compared with 78 percent in the
non-war zone community. Of the twenty cornmunity health workers serving in the
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rural areas around the war zone community, ten had been kidnapped, and five had
resigned due to threats from the contras. The auxiliary nurse in the local health post
had been killed.
Significant differences in degree of anxiety and depression were found among
people in the two towns, as measured on the Hopkins Symptom Checklist-25
(HSCL), but in the direction opposite of that expected. Among female heads of
household in the non-war zone community, 74.4 percent were classified as having
significant emotional stress, as compared with 54 percent in the war zone cornmunity.
Percentages of school-age children reporting nightmares was also higher in the non-
war zone cornmunity (60 percent as compared with 36 percent in the war zone
cornmunity) (Myers 1987:11). One explanation for the unexpected difference is that
the people from the war zone cornmunity are repressing their emotional stress in their
daily struggle to survive. People farther from the conflict may give freer expression to
their anxieties (Myers, personal communication).
Another explanation may be found in the nature of the Nicaraguan struggle itself.
"National revolutions, despite the high social costs they entail, have always meant, for
the people who are their own protagonists, the gradual regaining of a collective identity
and the forging of their own historie project. .. You can't separate psychology from
politics, from the way human beings are shaped by a particular historie moment . . .
The high level of popular participation, the presence of intemational solidarity, the
consciousness of participating in a historie process are themselves powerful and
effective resources, which compensate in part for the material resources that are
lacking" (attributed to Dr. Manuel Madriz in Instituto Historico Centroamericano
1987:17-19).
The self-conscious intensity of the struggle among people in the war zone
cornmunity may itself account for the lower prevalence of emotional distress. If such
is the case, then one of the manifest intentions of the United States' policy of low-
intensity conflict (LIC), to generate civilian discontent may have the opposite effect
among a population that sees itself as exercising independence and autonomy in the
face of direct aggression. If adults have more mental resources with which to handle
the emotional trauma caused by war, children have fewer resources and so are
especially vulnerable to psychological stress. CARE noted the difficulty of measuring
the extent and degree of psychological trauma due to the war. They estimate that there
may be 40,000 to 50,000 cases just among children, given the fact that some 400,000
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children live in the active conflict zones and that another 250,000 have been displaced
as their families fled the fighting (CARE 1988:11,14).
The Epidemiology of Survival
This historical overview of the evolution of the Nicaraguan political economy,
especially in war time, provides the context in which to analyze and evaluate the
programs of the intemational health organizations, planned and carried out with the
Nicaraguan government ministries. At issue is the extent to which the intemational
health organizations in Nicaragua place primary health care programs in a broader
context of coordination with social, economic, and political development. The
altematives to comprehensive primary care are, as Rifkin and Walt suggest, the more
narrowly focused "selective primary hea1th care" programs, such as child
immunization, oral rehydration therapy, and growth monitoring (1986:563). Selective
programs are more easily controlled by medical professionals, demand no community
planning, only minimallocal organization, and no change in the existing economic or
power relations in the society. As such, health is seen primarily as a disease problem,
not a development problem (1986:562). In the case of Nicaragua, the evidence
suggests that intemational health organizations early on attempted to place primary
health care effons within a development framework. Later, as the effects of military
and economic destabilization ovenook development effons, the international health
organizations turned to the suppon of survival programs.
UNICEF
Table 7 illustrates the kinds of programs and levels of funding provided by
UNICEF during the first period of health reorganization and expansion in Nicaragua.
While the funding of "selective primary care programs" is present, we note that the
largest percentage of funding went to primary health careo This ineluded an intensive
joint effon with the WHO and the MINSA to train severa! different types of volunteer
health promoters with specializations in sanitation, community health, mother-child
care, school health, occupational health, clinical care, and midwifery. Other health-
related progiams included water supply and sanitation in rural areas. UNICEF
provided funds to the Ministries of Education, Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, and
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the Social Security Institute (INSSBI) for several projects aimed at improving services
for disabled children, basic education, rural vocational education, pre-school services,
urban development, and nutritional improvements. These latter programs were at first
uncoordinated, which led to an effort beginning in 1984 and continuing in 1985 to
integrate the activities of the several governmental sectors receiving UNICEF funding.
These efforts were consolidated between 1986 and 1988, leading to intersectoral
cooperation and the integration of basic services provided by various ministries
(UNICEF 1988:2).
During the period 1984-1985, faced with increasing contra activity and
deteriorating economic conditions, the MINSA sought to consolidate its health efforts.
In part to offset its forced reallocation of resources to the secondary and tertiary levels
of care, the MINSA agreed to participate in the "Child Survival" program that
UNICEF was promoting throughout Central America. In Nicaragua the Child
Survival Program brought together and coordinated the activities of the Ministries of
Health, of Education, and of Social Welfare, as well as of the Faculty of Medicine
(UNICEF 1988:3).
At the same time UNICEF, WHOIPAHO, and the Nicaraguan government (GON)
initiated the Five Year Plan for Food and Nutrition (PQAN). The plan sought to
reinforce primary health care efforts among women and children, as well as move
toward a future national plan that would elaborate food policies designed to decrease
the possibilities ofmalnutrition (UNICEF 1988:4).
By 1986 the deteriorating conditions in the war zone (Regions I,V, and VI)
prompted UNICEF and the GON to formulate a Five Year Plan for Integrated Rural
Development (PQDRI) in which the basic services for children in education, health,
and welfare would be integrated. The infant mortality rate in the Central Region of the
country was 130/1000, double that of the national average. The war, besides the
casualties, also produced major inteITUptionsin the peasant agricultural economy in the
Central Region. The result has been abandonment of the rural countryside,
resettlement of peasants into cooperatives and state farms, or migration to the cities, all
accompanied by a widespread decline in agricultural production and an increase in
malnutrition. For that reason UNICEF and the GON elected to bring the Child
Survival Program and the Feeding and Nutrition Program, both national programs,
under the general umbrella of the Rural Development Plan in the Central Region. In
each program UNICEF has been an advocate within the GON for intersectoral
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coordination, as well as community participation in the planning and delivery of
services (UNICEF 1988:5).
The activities of UNlCEF undertaken since 1984, detailed in table 8, clearly reflect
the needs generated by the war, especially, but not exclusively, in the Central Region
of the country. The deteriorating nutritionallevels of children, increasing cases of
transmittable diseases, particularly measles, and growing numbers of war refugees, all
characteristic of this period, continue to the presento As a consequence, by 1988 three-
quarters of UNICEF's funding was targeted to rural development in the war zone,
child health care, and feeding and nutrition programs. The other programs undertaken
since 1984 and listed in table 8 have been themselves integrated into the Rural
Development Plan (PQDRI).
Between 1986 and 1988, UNICEF continued to cooperate with the MINSA to
integrate health programs with the development efforts of the several ministerial
bureaucracies of the GON working in the conflicted Central Region of the country. In
the process it became evident that the national/regional/health area structure of the
National Health System (SNUS) and the general administration of the MINSA did not
lend themselves readily to the Rural Development Plan under way in the Central
Region. The health region/clinic area structure had grown out of the early attempt to
redistribute health resources more equitably throughout the country. The intent of the
regional/area structure was standardization of the size and distribution of the
population to be served. Health sector boundaries were bureaucratically drawn to
conform to what seemed to be the most rational distribution of resources for a given
population. The medical referral system linking health post to area clinic to regional
hospitallikewise reflected the planners' model. While the region/clinic area structure
achieved numerical homogeneity, it did not correspond to internal social, economic,
and hygienic diversity. "Geographical boundaries were created that did not
correspond to the tradition or reality, lived and felt by the local inhabitants" (OPS-
Nicaragua 1988:23).
The war gradually exacerbated the differences between model and reality already
present in the delivery structure. The war gradually created population shifts and
changed morbidity patterns both in the war zones as well as in the areas to which
refugees fled. The centralized planning and delivery activities of the MINSA at both
national and regional headquarters did not allow adequate response to population shifts
and to changing health needs at the locallevel. As a result, certain health facilities
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were underutilizOO while others were overwhelmed. Allocation of medicines and
supplies suffered the same disequilibrium. The result was local outbreaks of disease,
such as the measles epidemic in 1986 in Region VI. Finally, the SNUS, never well
coordinatOOwith the health efforts of the armOOforces, the private sector, or with the
health activities of other ministries, often duplicatOOservices at the locallevel.
In its Health Plan 1988-1990, the MINSA proposedthe implementation of "The
Territorial Health System" ("Los Sistemas Territoriales de Salud" STS) (MINSA
1988b:190-196). The intent was to retain the same criteria of equity found in the
original regionaVarea structure. The organizational focus, however, would no longer
be the area clinic or regional hospital, but the local cornmunity comprising homes,
schools, day-care centers, factories and workshops, and whatever community
organizations exist in a given territory, neighborhood (barrio) or rural district (reparto)
(OPS-Nicaragua 1988:18). WHO/PAHO became the major facilitator of this
reorganizational effort.
WHO/PAHO
Between 1980 and 1982, the World Health Organization and its regional affiliate,
the Pan American Health Organization, providOOover $9 million 10health programs in
Nicaragua. An additional $5 million was addOOto that amount between 1983 and
1985 (interview with Dr. Miguel Marquez, representative of the WHO/pAHO in
Managua, in Barricada, July 13, 1983, p. 14). In March 1982, WHO, PAHO, and
UNICEF enterOOinto a dialogue with the Ministries of Health and of Planning on
primary health care strategies for Nicaragua (MIPLAN/MINSA 1981:7; MINSA n.d.).
The discussions 100to the presentation in April 1982 of the Comprehensive Plan for
Assistance to Health Areas (PIAAS) by the Division of Primary Health Care (MINSA
1982). The purpose of the plan was to provide the area c1inicdirectors with a uniform
planning, organizational, and reporting too1. Other major areas of WHO/P AHO
support were in the provision of vaccines and the cold chain during the mass drug
administration programs, called Popular Health Days. In 1982, WHO/P AHO
officialIy recognized Nicaragua's early successes in primary health care, and in 1983




During the Second Period (1984-1985), WHO/pAHO focused its attention on the
support of maternal-child health care programs, and feeding and nutritional programs.
Support for these programs continued during the Third Period (1986-1988)
(OPS/OMS/ INCAP-PASCAP 1987; OPS 1988; OPS/lNCAP 1988). However, in
1988 WHO/pAHO turned its attention to the organizational problems that faced the
SNUS as a result of the war, specifically to the proposed reorganization of the Health
Regions into a Tenitorial Health System (STS) (MINSA 1988b:190-196; OPS-
Nicaragua 1988). Based upon its own experience (OPS-Washington 1988), PAHO
offered three specific objectives for the reorganization. The first was 10assure that the
health interventions were necessary and able to meet the health needs of the people in
that particular place. The second objective was to caITyout the reorganization in such
a way as to overcome any "top-down" features of the programs and lack of contact
between levels of careo Third, there had to be an effort to assure community
participation as well as coordination of health efforts among whatever providers,
public or private, existed in the locality.
Ten strategies were elaborated to enhance the achievement of the objectives of the
Territorial Health System. Health activities are to be integrated with the development
efforts carried out by other ministries in fields such as housing, agriculture, and
commerce. Decision-making authority must be decentralized and concentrated at the
level where the effects of the action are to realized. Planning should be situational and
relevant 10the needs and opportunities found in the locale. Local health planning wiil
demand the reactivation of Popular Health Councils, but this time at a more local
(tenitorial) leve!. National ministries must allow the varlous sectors (education,
commerce, transport, housing, water and sewerage, agriculture, and industry) to plan
and act with authority at the local leve!. The STS requires an information base
necessary for the decision-making process which refIects local conditions. Local
administrative capacity for carrying out local projects should be reinforced. Disease
prevention and control programs need to be integrated at the local leve!. MINSA
personnel will need to be trained to administer the actions undertaken in the STS.
Finally, research activities must be initiated that would provide the feedback necessary
for the STS to adapt to meet changing conditions at the locallevel (OPS-Nicaragua
1988:25-35).
On August 9, 1989 the first test of the STS was undenaken. On that date,
President Daniel Ortega announced the Campaign for the Defense of the Lives of
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Children (Frieden 1988:15; MINSA 1988c). The goal of the campaign is to reduce
infant and child mortality by 50 percent by concentrating efforts on diarrheal illness,
respiratory infections, and neo natal mortality. Strategies include increasing
vaccination levels, and medical encounters among children, and redirecting resources
to the war-torn Central Region, scene of highest infant and child mortality and
increasing malnutrition. The campaign is funded in part by UNICEF as a component
of their Five Year Plan for Child Survival (1986-1990). The campaign, however,
incorporates several features of the STS Program supported by WHO/P AHO. These
features include intersectoral coordination at national, regional, and locallevels, as
well as active participation at the locallevel. Symbolic of the intersectoral coordination
is the fact that the campaign is not directed by MINSA, but by a presidential
commission made up of the Ministries of Health, Education, Transportation,
Construction, and Agriculture, as well as the unions and the armed forces. The
intersectoral structure is repeated at regional and locallevels where MINSA, local
municipal governments, and popular organizations are also involved. At the locallevel
health workers are provided with discount bus fares. Road construction is to focus on
inaccessible areas with high infant mortality. More hygiene will be taught in the
schools and priority construction will be given to schools that lack water or sewerage.
The army has begun to provide janitorial and waste management services to hospital s
and health centers. Agricultural cooperatives are allocating milk for pregnant women
and children. Unions and the Ministry of Agriculture are providing basic food baskets
to pregnant women and women with young children (Frie den 1988:15). The
campaign represents a mix of vertical and horizontal health strategies in a coordinated
development programo
While the success of the WHO/P AHO projects in support of the STS and child
survival can only be judged at a later date, the nature of the projects and the decision to
support them is what is of relevance to the argument in this paper.
Conclusion
The questions raised at the beginning of this paper had to do with the allegations of
critics who argue that international health organizations playa politically conservative
role in Third"World nations. Our discussion has focused upon the case of Nicaragua.
We can now make some comparisons and offer some conclusions.
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Ugalde (1985:48-49) COITectIyplaces the promotion ofprimary health care through
organized community participation in the larger context of political theory. Dodson
and O'Shaughnessy (1985:123-124) take a similar approach in their analysis of the
role of base Christian communities in the democratization of Nicaraguan society. Both
see these organizations as expressions of popular as opposed to liberal democracy.
When organized into health committees, into neighborhood churches, or into
agricultural cooperatives, people are participating in a democratic process as legitimate
as, but different from, that characterized by political parties, elections, and
representative government. One might even argue that electoral politics is a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for a genuine democracy to existo Electoral democracy
without grass-roots organization, local decision-making and accountability does not
guarantee either equity or protection of human rights.
Ugalde goes on to argue that the promotion of health committees by intemational
organizations as "forums to express the demands or to request assistance when it is
needed" is, in his words, "wishful thinking" (OPS\Washington 1978:14 quoted in
Ugalde 1985:48). In fact, Ugalde concludes that such symbolic participation may
legitimate status quo regimes by producing compliant leaders after destroying popular,
democratic ones (1985:49). In his mind, such decision-making, planning, and
management are political functions and not actions properly taken by voluntary
associations of citizens.
Yet, I would argue in the case of Nicaragua, that intemational health organizations
share a common purpose with local health committees. Both have significant roles to
play in the formation and consolidation of the Nicaraguan state. Both act as catalysts
of change, from above and below, in the process of nation building. Once Somoza's
"liberal democracy" was overthrown, citizen involvement in the political process in
Nicaragua found expression in the literacy crusade, popular health days, neighborhood
defense committees, and agrarian cooperativismo The Sandinistas institutionalized the
Popular Health Councils at local, regional, and nationallevels to offset the bureaucratic
dominance of medical professionals within the MINSA (Donahue 1986:95). Initial
funds from UNICEF went to the training of primary health care workers to work
within the broadIy defined development goals of the govemment. When it became
clear that the Nicaraguan govemment lacked an integration of services provided by
several ministries, international organizations again assisted in that effort.
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As the war strained the resources of the govemment to meet the needs of people in
the central and eastem regions of the country, intemational organizations, such as
PAHO and UNICEF, supported govemment child survival and nutrition programs,
but as part of an integrated development effort among the severa! state agencies in each
region. The most recent example of how intemational organizations can assist in the
consolidation of the state is the Territorial Health Systems (STS). This effort is, in
reality, a redefinition of the boundaries of political decision-making. The outcome
may be a more appropriate legal and juridical framework in which to address
development and survival issues at the most locallevel. For the first time in Nicaragua
local organizations of citizens will have the legal authority to participate in planning
and in fiscal decision-making affecting development efforts in their cornmunities.
Intemational health organizations have played a significant role in the integration
and consolidation of the Nicaraguan state apparatus, first in the health sector and then
gradually among several sectors. These efforts have been successful, in spite of a war
of economic and military destabilization, because of the tenacity of the political
leadership and the broad participatory base of the revolution. In sum, Nicaragua is an
arena in which intemational organizations are in a struggle to build up or tear down a
young state. The survival, to date, of the revolutionary Nicaraguan state is the result
of the convergence of intemational support and broadIy popular national agendas.
Notes
l. For purposes of comparison I have divided the postrevolutionary history into two periods,
"Peace Time" (1980-1983) and "War Time" (1984-1987). In reality, the war's impact was felt in some
areas much earlier (Garfield 1985). By 1984, however, the effects of the war can be seen clearly in
Region I (Esteli), Region V (Chontales and Boaco), Region VI (Matagalpa and Jinotega), as well as in
the Special Zones on the Atlantic coast (see map).
2. The CARE report pointed to a "fundamental contradiction in the legislation" between the
congressional restriction placed on working through Nicaraguan governmental institutions and the fact
that most of the nongovemmental aid organizations do in fact work closely with the government. The
report also warned that short-term interventions by NGOs would not provide for continuity of care,
implying that only governmental institutions could effectively do so in the long run.
In mid-September 1988 the govemment of Nicaragua refused the congressional aid. President
Ortega commented, "Although in dire economic need and suffering many problems, we Nicaraguans
cannot accept from the Yankee Congress this bloodstained money as long as that Congress continues
debating the allocation of more funds against the Nicaraguan people" (Washington Post, September
21, 1988, p. A28).
3. CARE (1988:48) provided a list of Key Service Providers in Nicaragua which serves as the
basis for the following enumeration.
A. Govemment Organizations: The Govemment Ministry of Health (MINSA); The Ministry of
Social Services (INSSBI); The Ministry of Education.
B. Multilateral Institutions: United National High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR); The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); Pan American Health Organization
(pAHO/WHO); The World Food Program (WFP).
C. Private Voluntary Organizations: American Friends Service Committee, USA; Association
for the Development of Villages; CANSA VE; CARE; CARITAS; the Evangelical Development
Center (CEPAD); Christo Rey; The Catholic Institute of Intemational Relations (CIIR); Church of
the Brethren; The Franciscan Fathers; GVC (an ltalian organization that cooperates with OXFAM);
HAP-NICA (agricultural development project); IBSIM (a Moravian development organization); Juan
XXIII; MADRES; The Maryknoll Fathers and Brothers; The Maryknoll Sisters; Medecins de Monde;
Medecins Sans Frontieres; National Association of the Partners of the Americas (NAPA); Nicaraguan
Red Cross; Nic~guan Wheelchair Repair Project; NOVIB (a Dutch organization that cooperates with
OXFAM); PRONICA; OXFAM Beligique; OXFAM United States; Quixote Center; Redd Barna-
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Norway; Save the Children Federation, USA; Unitarian Universalist Service Committee; United
States-Nicaragua Sister Cities Program; Witness foe Peace.
D. Bilateral Assistance Organizations: Dutch, Norwegian, Spanish.
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